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 Escape FDI and the dynamics of a cumulative process of institutional misalignment and contestation:  
Stress, strain and failure 
 
Abstract 
We argue that escape foreign direct investment (FDI) happens when unknown future “rules of the 
game” cause concern about the continued productive capacity of the economy. Adapting the stress-
strain-fail model of materials failure, we argue that escape FDI is a process with three cumulative 
phases. Conditions for escape FDI (stress) are created by institutional deterioration and contained 
contestation. Limited escape FDI (strain) results from periods of societal instability and/or inadequate 
institutional reforms. Extensive escape FDI (failure) results from pervasive societal instability and/or 
fundamental changes in institutions. Using a historical approach, we develop these propositions for 
South Africa, 1956 to 2012.    
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Escape FDI and the dynamics of a cumulative process of institutional misalignment and contestation:   
Stress, strain and failure 
 
During the first meeting in 1990 between one of South Africa’s most prominent businessmen, Johann 
Rupert and Cyril Ramaphosa, an African National Congress (ANC) leader and from 2018 the country’s 
President, Ramaphosa confronted Rupert about why the South African-controlled luxury group 
Richemont had been incorporated in Luxembourg rather than South Africa. Rupert replied: “Cyril, it’s 
actually very simple, and you can tell that to your stakeholders. I have to protect the assets of my 
stakeholders, the shareholders, against your stakeholders – so that if they want to steal stuff, they won’t 
be able to do so” (Dommisse, 2005: 326). The comment by Rupert highlights an important but under-
theorized explanation for internationalization, namely escape foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of escape FDI.  
Escape FDI occurs when managers go abroad either in search of advantages there or to avoid 
poor domestic conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula & Un, 2015). Since Lall in 1983 had argued that FDI 
could be a "logical means of escape" for what he termed third world multinationals, a number of 
scholars had used escape FDI as a concept (e.g. Bulatov, 1998; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Kalotay, 2004; 
Liu, Buck & Shu, 2005; Stal & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011).  However, the term has long lacked precision. Thus 
FDI to escape the “perceived institutional hardship” (Boisot & Meyer, 2008) in China can be argued to 
carry many similarities to created-asset seeking FDI, while Luo and Tung's (2007:487) claim that "some 
South African MNEs, such as SABMiller, have to operate globally to […] escape from the limited domestic 
market” suggests that escape FDI could be conceptually close to market-seeking FDI.   
 In this paper, we suggest a more precise conceptualization of escape FDI. We define escape FDI 
as FDI that occurs when firms seek to limit their exposure to a home country because unknown future 
“rules of the game” (i.e. institutional arrangements) call into question the perceived potential 
productive capacity of the economy. We in particular argue that three elements need to receive 
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attention: the role of institutional misalignment, which we argue results from changes in institutions 
rather than their weakness (even though profound changes often happen in institutionally weak 
contexts), the role of societal contestation, and finally the fact that escape FDI is a cumulative process.  
To allow us to map changes over time, we use a historical approach, and investigate FDI from 
South Africa from 1956 to 2012. 1956 marks the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela for his anti-Apartheid 
activities and 1994 marks the first democratic elections in South Africa, marking the beginning of a 
period of profound institutional transformation. By 2012, the failure of many post-Apartheid reforms 
was becoming apparent, triggering a different set of challenges. We therefore do not extend our 
analysis beyond 2012. We use indices of institutional rights (specifically property rights and political 
rights) as well as a measure of social instability over the same period. Finally, we use evidence of the 
thinking and actions of a number of South African analysts and business leaders during the period under 
review. As is customary with the historical method, we present the evidence chronologically, and 
intertwine the discussion of our evidence with the results.  
We borrow from the stress-strain-fail model of failure in materials research to explain how 
escape FDI is a cumulative process that results from increasing institutional misalignment and societal 
contestation. In materials theory, a force acting on an object causes stress, while strain is the change in 
the material’s shape or form (but not load carrying capacity) if the stress is sustained. If a material 
eventually fails, it loses its load carrying capacity. Similarly, we argue that escape FDI starts under 
“stress” conditions, and specifically when episodes of societal contestation and some institutional 
misalignment occur in a country. If episodes of contestation become more frequent or intense, so that 
the misalignment between the expectations of firms and the institutions of the country gets more 
severe, we see “strain”, where increasing amounts of FDI leave the country. Finally, “failure”, the 
concluding and most marked phase of escape FDI, takes place when there is severe societal contestation 
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and/or fundamental changes to institutions. The resulting misalignment – even when such changes 
represent potentially positive reforms for the future – triggers a flood of escape FDI. 
Our evidence that escape FDI is a process that takes place through three cumulative phases 
suggests that scholars need to change how they examine escape FDI. One of the contributions of this 
paper is that it demonstrates the inadequacy of arguing that escape FDI results from “weak” institutions. 
Instead, escape FDI happens when there is either societal contestation, or when there is not alignment 
between firms and national institutions. We show that escape FDI happens when (the extent or nature 
of) the future productive capacity of the country is not evident. Therefore funds leave the country either 
during severe societal tension or during (the often coinciding) reform processes. In short, we contribute 
to a richer understanding of escape FDI, and in so doing, also document the role of the home country in 
internationalization.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Using a conceptualization similar to that of Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula and Un (2015:31), when the 
"manager takes the firm abroad to explore for better sources of advantage and [to] avoid the poor 
conditions of the home country", examples of FDI as different as from China to an advanced country 
(e.g. Luo & Wang 2012) and from Germany to China (Witt and Lewin, 2007) have been described as 
escape FDI.  But by just focusing on what is more desirable relative to the home country, it is hard to see 
how escape FDI differs from other motives for FDI. We instead propose that escape FDI can be defined 
as FDI that occurs when firms seek to limit their exposure to a home country because unknown future 
institutional conditions, the “rules of the game” by which firms need to operate, cause doubt about the 
productive capacity of the economy.  
 We propose three clarifications to current literature on escape FDI. The first builds on the work 
of Witt and Lewin (2007) and suggests that escape results from institutional misalignment rather than 
weak institutions per se. The second is to explicitly theorize societal contestation as a precursor of 
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escape. Although some notion of contestation is implied in the very term, few scholars have examined 
its implications. The third is to understand escape FDI as a cumulative process. To do so, and 
understanding that escape FDI represents some kind of failure in the home economy, we borrow and 
adapt the stress-strain-fail model from materials research. This allows us to conceptualize escape FDI as 
a series of cumulative phases where funds first start “leaking” from the home economy and intensifying 
until a veritable “flood” of FDI results.  
Institutional misalignment 
Apart from Lall's 1983 argument that FDI could be a "logical means of escape" from less developed 
countries, the first main use of escape FDI as a concept was in the post-Soviet era, initially in a study of 
Slovenian FDI to Germany (Svetličič, Rojec & Lebar, 1994) and later more widely (Andreff, 2003; Bulatov, 
1998; Kalotay, 2002; 2003). Although there can be little doubt that the post-Soviet institutional 
environment was characterized by both weakness and far-reaching changes in institutions, subsequent 
scholarship has emphasized primarily the weakness of institutions. However, we argue that in the post-
Soviet context, it was not institutional weakness but instead institutional misalignment – resulting from 
the profound changes in the institutional environment – that was critical in triggering escape FDI. 
In 1998, Bulatov surveyed and found support for a range of "push" factors in the 
internationalization of Russian multinational corporations (MNCs). A substantial number of respondents 
expressed concern about the high inflation rate, an indicator of a weak institutional infrastructure. But 
the other concerns that emerged as important – political instability, legal instability and the need for "a 
'spare business' ensuring against disturbances in Russia" (1998:78) all suggest a concern not just with 
institutional weakness, but specifically with unpredictable changes in the institutional environment. 
Similarly, Andreff (2003) argued that "system escape" can be explained by a host of factors, ranging 
from matters that clearly relate to a weak institutional environment, e.g. prohibitive domestic taxation, 
export quotas and high inflation, as well as some that relate to changeability, such as political instability.  
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The distinction between institutional weakness and institutional changes was not pointed out by 
either the initial or the subsequent scholars of post-Soviet internationalization. Thus Kalotay (2004) 
argued that Russian FDI was aimed at “escaping a difficult business environment” (2004:164), while 
Filippov in 2010 argued that in spite of increased economic stability, Russian MNCs continued to venture 
abroad to safeguard themselves against "political risks". 
Subsequent scholarship investigated escape FDI from a range of other countries, including a 
comparison of Mexico and Hungary (Dörner, 2005), China (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Liu, Buck & Shu, 
2005) and wider (Luo & Tung, 2007; Stal & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Where both weak and changing or 
changeable institutions were mentioned in these studies, scholars once again did not differentiate 
between them. Thus Stal and Cuervo-Cazurra (2011:215) mention aspects like the lack of legal 
protection for property rights and poor enforcement of commercial laws (two indicators of weak but 
potentially stable institutions) alongside political instability and unpredictable regulatory changes, two 
indicators of institutional changeability.  
Moreover, in most studies institutional weakness received greater attention than institutional 
misalignment. Thus Luo and Tung (2007:488) argue that entrepreneurs from developing countries often 
seek "better legal protection overseas over their property rights and business activities than they face at 
home". This type of argument was also made about China, although subsequent empirical evidence 
suggested that the weakness of institutions in China did not drive escape FDI (Liu, Buck & Shu, 2005). 
Indeed, Child and Rodrigues (2005:401) argue that "institutional constraints such as legal uncertainties, 
obstruction of domestic acquisitions, and regional protectionism through license restrictions do remain 
a problem, but it seems that successful firms have found ways to accommodate or circumvent them." 
In fact, a body of evidence suggests that weak institutions in an economy need not inhibit 
economic activity. In their study of China and Russia, Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot (2010) concluded that 
the informal institutional environment was so well embedded that it was unlikely that entrepreneurs 
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would rely fully on formal institutions even when they became better developed. In the words of Luo 
and Chung (2013), firms can either “fill” or “abuse” institutional voids. Either way, managers may be 
able to find ways to manage “around” weak institutions and even find entrepreneurial opportunities in 
"institutional voids" (Mair & Marti, 2009). 
We instead argue that weak institutions per se similarly do not trigger escape FDI and that 
instead, escape FDI is triggered by institutional misalignment. This builds on the thinking of Witt and 
Lewin (2007), who argue that the ossification (rather than changeability) of the German institutional 
context was the reason why German firms chose to internationalize to China. While the ossification of a 
well-developed institutional regime is one reason for misalignment, we argue that misalignment more 
commonly is found in rapidly changing national institutional environments which is often the case in 
emerging markets.  
The Soviet case demonstrates well that weak institutions and turbulent institutions often co-
occur. To give an example: After the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy at the end 
of the Soviet era, foreign currency had become in principle obtainable. But severe currency shortages 
meant that businesses could not know whether or when currency would be available to them, resulting 
in severe liquidity constraints (Andreff, 2003). There clearly was a misalignment between what was 
nominally and practically possible, between the types of strategies firms could conceptualize and those 
they could execute. We argue that it was this misalignment rather than institutional weakness that led 
to escape FDI.  
Contestation 
Our second main argument is that an element of contestation is a precursor of escape FDI. Compare the 
differences in meaning of "leaving prison" versus "escaping prison", or "leaving a bad relationship" 
versus "escaping a bad relationship". In all cases, there is a move away from an undesirable state. Yet 
when the term "escape" is used, there is also a suggestion that the change happened in spite of some 
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contestation. Many scholars imply some notion of contestation in how the concept is used, for example 
Luo and Tung (2007:487) when they argue that some South African MNCs "have to operate globally to 
avoid governmental control over foreign exchange usage". Similarly, Enderwick (2017) argues that 
escape FDI can result from “discriminatory” government policy. The notion of contestation is clearly 
implicit in such arguments. However, it is not made explicit, and neither are the indicators or 
implications of contestation examined. We believe that international business scholarship can benefit 
from greater engagement with the notion of contestation and particularly societal contestation – how it 
manifests, and how it is part of escape FDI.  
Cumulative process   
Finally, we argue that escape FDI has to be understood cumulatively, because FDI not only takes place 
over time, but also progresses through different phases, taking different forms in different time periods. 
Moreover, if we accept that escape FDI is associated with institutional misalignment and societal 
contestation, it has to be understood as some type of “failure” in the home economy. We therefore turn 
to the model of failure from materials science.  
The failure of materials can be described in three phases. The first phase involves "stress". At 
this point, the material experiences some force, but there is no visible evidence of stress. The second 
phase, "strain", occurs when the ongoing force results in some visible deformation in the material, but 
the material still fulfils its function. The final phase, "failure", takes place as a result of sustained strain, 
and involves the loss of the load carrying capacity of the material (Boller & Seeger, 2013; Ramberg & 
Osgood, 1943). This is a stylized account; different materials have different stress-strain curves, and the 
precise points at which transitions between the phases take place are affected by multiple factors and in 
fact are not always clear. But as non-materials scientists, we find the stylized outline useful and we use 
the three phases illustratively to structure our discussion of institutional misalignment, contestation and 
the cumulative nature of escape FDI.  
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Our argument is that institutional changes together with contestation from firms and citizens 
place stress on the local economy. Initially, the effects seem minimal, but continued stress will lead to 
visible strain. Scholars have previously documented the outcomes of such stress conditions. For 
example, political instability is likely to result in stalled economic growth (Aisen & Veiga, 2013; Alesina, 
Özler, Roubini & Swagel, 1996), while political risk can also be expected to decrease inward FDI (Busse & 
Hefeker, 2007; Desbordes, 2010).  
In addition, outward FDI (OFDI) may well increase as entrepreneurial firms “springboard” to new 
countries in their search for opportunities abroad (Luo & Tung, 2007). Although some part of this OFDI 
may be escape FDI, at this point it is not yet clear how the FDI differs from market-seeking or created-
asset seeking motives. We argue that escape FDI is most likely and most clearly found when there is 
failure in the perceived "load carrying capacity" of the local economy. When the extent of stress in the 
local economy continues beyond a certain point, firms may choose to shift their operations to outside 
the borders of the local economy to a location with institutional and other conditions that they perceive 
as more amenable to their operations. Such decisions, we contend, reflect escape FDI.  
In the subsequent section, we offer historical evidence of the build-up, zenith and demise of 
Apartheid, and demonstrate the links between those historical events in South Africa – both the nature 
of institutions and social contestation – and escape FDI. We conclude by suggesting three propositions 
on escape FDI.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Methodology 
Yin (1981; 1994) argues that a case study is the most appropriate design for studying a complex social 
phenomenon where there is a blurring of boundaries between the context and the phenomenon. This is 
the case for escape FDI. Indeed, one of the challenges in finding empirical evidence for escape FDI is that 
it tends to follow an idiosyncratic course. For example, escape FDI in Argentina at the turn of the century 
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was triggered by the failure of dollarization, while in Venezuela a decade later, it was triggered by 
attempts to nationalize and cut ties with the US. Although commonalties between those cases can be 
articulated, they tend to be at a very high level (e.g. “political factors”).  
 Yin (1994) also argues that a single case design is acceptable, provided the chosen case 
demonstrates rare and unique events, a point elaborated by Siggelkow (2007) with his metaphor of a 
"talking pig". We believe that the South African case is fitting for investigating escape FDI. From when 
the ANC in 1960 decided to oppose Apartheid through an “armed struggle”, resistance to Apartheid not 
only intensified, but also became more violent. Initially there was little change to South Africa’s OFDI, 
but by 1985 OFDI was exceeding incoming FDI. This pattern violates the predictions of the Investment 
Development Path (Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Narula; 1996; Narula, 1996) for a country at the level of 
development that South Africa was. Finally, South Africa has recently been acknowledged as a 
particularly prolific source of emerging market MNCs, outperforming many of its much larger 
counterparts in the sheer number of MNCs it has produced (Luiz & Ruplal, 2013). Collectively, these 
observations suggested some anomaly that needed investigating. 
Having selected the case, the question must be answered about the best approach to collecting 
and analyzing evidence. Understanding changing levels of not only outward FDI (OFDI) and inward FDI 
(IFDI), but also of institutional rights and social contestation is key to our argument, requiring the use of 
quantitative evidence. Yin (1984) offers useful guidelines, highlighting that quantitative evidence is 
appropriate for case analysis, and that the analysis of quantitative data of a case would typically involve 
the tabulation of meaningful events, followed by "pattern matching" (Yin, 1994). Another approach is to 
use the historical method. The historical method has recently received renewed attention in 
management scholarship (Kipping & Üsdiken, 2014; Maclean, Harvey & Clegg, 2016) and holds 
substantial promise for the enrichment of management scholarship (Godfrey, Hassard, O’Connor, 
Rowlinson & Ruef, 2016). 
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In this paper, we use what has been termed a "history to theory" approach (Kipping & Üsdiken, 
2014). We use the historical method in the gathering and analysis of (most of) our data, and then use 
the historical evidence to help develop our theory. In the case of a "history to theory" approach, the 
theory is presumed to be general, but historical data are used because the data are perceived to be 
“somehow well suited to contribute to theory building or testing” (Kipping & Üsdiken, 2014:541). This 
approach is increasingly used in international business research, for example in the work of Cuervo-
Cazurra and Rui (2017). Building on the work of Kipping and Üsdiken, scholars developed a typology of 
four conceptualizations of history in organization studies based on differences in the purpose and mode 
of enquiry possible for studies with a historical approach (Maclean, Harvey & Clegg, 2016). 
We see our work as an example of "history as conceptualizing"; we use history as a resource to 
enable the exposition and elaboration of ideas, constructs and theory, while the theoretical ideas 
remain embedded in the narrative (Maclean, Harvey & Clegg, 2016:614). This approach is argued to be 
especially well suited for the generation of new theoretical constructs. While escape FDI as a construct is 
not novel, we believe that previous studies have not provided the richness of explanation as we do in 
this paper.  
In adopting a historical approach to the study of business, three important tensions have been 
identified, and we believe it is important to explain how we deal with these tensions. The first deals with 
the tension between "narrative and analysis" (Rowlinson, Hassard & Decker, 2014:252), or simply put, 
whether the bulk of theorizing takes place before or during the presentation of evidence. We follow 
norms of management scholarship in presenting our general argument upfront, but offer propositions 
only as the necessary evidence is presented. In that sense, we privilege a narrative approach.  
Another important tension stems from differing assessments of "quality" evidence. Organization 
scholars generally prefer data that they have" constructed", e.g. through interviews or surveys, in the 
belief that it yields "richer" insights, whereas business historians privilege evidence "found" in sources 
13 
 
like archives for being presumably more "accurate" (Rowlinson, Hassard & Decker, 2014). Thus for 
organizational scholars, replicability is central (in good research, another scholar should be able to 
replicate the method), while historians value verifiability (another scholar should be able to go to the 
same archive and find the same evidence). The bulk of our evidence is historical, as we believe that it is 
important to map changes over time.  
We also give information about the actions of South African executives and firms over the 
period. Although all escape FDI is OFDI, it does not follow that all OFDI is escape FDI. Because we are 
specifically interested in escape FDI, we add qualitative information about South African businesses to 
explain their thinking in the different time periods. Similarly, we use historical evidence to demonstrate 
changes in the levels of institutional rights, but rely on commentators to highlight to what extent those 
changes can be argued to reflect institutional misalignment.  
The final tension has to do with how time is handled. Management scholars tend to have a 
chronological approach to time, while historians see periodization, i.e. the chunking of time into distinct 
periods, as a part of their task (Rowlinson, Hassard & Decker, 2014:258-259). Our evidence reveals clear 
periods (corresponding to the stages of escape FDI), but they are not of the same chronological 
duration.  
Setting 
This study focuses on South Africa from 1956 to 2012. After the creation of the Union of South Africa in 
1910, a political system was cemented that excluded the majority black South Africans from participation. 
At the same time, an economic dispensation sought to create cheap and abundant sources of black labor 
to facilitate industrial development. These goals were achieved through an intricate set of racial legislation 
and sprawling bureaucratic and security organs cemented by the courts, prison system and other state 
institutions. One of the cornerstones of this system was the Native Land Act of 1913, which set aside about 
7% (extended to 13% in 1936) of the country for black ownership, and precluded black South Africans 
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from ownership in the remaining 93% of the land. The result was the increasing impoverishment of black 
South Africans and their growing dependence on urban work. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 (amended 
in 1926) instituted a color bar in the mining industry, entrenching job reservation. Black South African 
miners' wages remained roughly the same in real terms between 1911 and 1972, whilst the real wages of 
white South Africans rose steadily from 1922 until the 1970s, when the pressure for African wage 
increases rose (Van der Berg, 1989:189).  
This oppressive attitude became government policy when the National Party came to power on 
an "Apartheid" mandate in 1948, and more repressive laws were introduced. Table 1 lists some of the 
more important laws. In 1956, the starting point for our study, the deterioration of rights in South Africa 
accelerated, e.g. the infamous “pass laws” that limited the movement of black South Africans were 
extended to women, resulting in widespread protest. It was also the year during which the treason trial 
for Mandela’s anti-Apartheid activities started. What followed was a period of growing instability as the 
state struggled to contain the social unrest and resorted to a combination of more repression followed by 
some relaxation and reform and then a total onslaught with a state of emergency.  
[Table 1 about here] 
In 1994, after substantial turmoil, Apartheid was dismantled and Nelson Mandela elected as the 
first president of a democratic South Africa. The subsequent years saw the repeal of numerous 
discriminatory acts, and also the creation of new non-racial institutions.  
In August 2012, the Marikana massacre took place during which 34 people died. This represented 
the most lethal use of national security forces against civilians since the Sharpeville riots in 1960. Marikana 
has been described as a turning point in South African history by both journalists and academics 
(Alexander, 2013; Chinguno, 2013). Concerned that the Marikana massacre may have rung in a new era 
where a democratic and majority-black government perpetrates actions once associated with the 
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Apartheid era, our study does not extend beyond 2012. Table 2 highlights the political and economic state 
of the country during the time under study.  
[Table 2] 
It is important to note that South Africa during most of the time under study was deeply racialized. We 
use the categories and terms used at the time, notably Black, “Coloured” (mixed-race), Indian and White 
without endorsing the terminology or indeed the validity of the categories. Where they occur, we also 
retain the titles of some of the laws that refer to a problematic earlier term for Black people, namely 
“Bantu” people.  
Data 
Institutional metrics 
Apartheid was characterized by the restriction of political and property rights, and institutional mis- and 
realignment throughout the rise and fall of Apartheid can be seen in the changes in these rights. We use 
indicators of political and property rights because they are precise enough to capture the specificity of 
the South African context but still general enough to ensure replicability. The methodology employed in 
constructing the institutional indexes is explained in detail in Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001). The 
indices were initially developed for the Apartheid era, but we extend them until 2012.  
In terms of political rights, it is worth highlighting that not only beliefs about what are 
appropriate political rights but also actual political rights have been evolving over time. The components 
of political and civil liberties that constitute our measure, based on criteria from the political science 
literature (Bollen, 1992; Bollen & Paxton, 2000), include voting rights, freedom of association, freedom 
of assembly, freedom of expression, the extent of arbitrary executive power, independence of the 
judiciary and the legislature, government secrecy or indemnity, due process of laws, freedom of 
movement, academic freedom, and religious freedom.  
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Similarly, the ‘ideal’ set of property rights is based upon seven criteria: the right to possess, the 
right to use, the right to manage, the right to capital, the right to security, the power to transfer, and the 
liability of execution. International business scholars tend to focus on intellectual property, e.g. through 
patenting activity, when considering property rights. The importance of intellectual property, even in 
less developed countries, has indeed grown in recent years (Narula & Dunning, 2000; 2010). But this 
study examines a middle-income country with a strong mining industry over the second half of the 20th 
century, and an assessment of property rights more generally seems more appropriate for capturing the 
potential for economic activity. Immovable property, especially land, and given the importance of 
mining to South Africa’s economy, also mineral rights, are precursors of economic activity, and are used 
in the index. (For further discussion see Fedderke, de Kadt & Luiz; 2001; Luiz, Pereira & Oliveira, 2013.) 
For both political and property rights, the primary source documents were laws and regulations 
that had been passed in the different years in the study. The legal changes were reviewed by a multi-
disciplinary panel of experts who determined whether they improved, diminished or kept neutral, 
relative to the previous year, the rights of South Africans. Figure 1 demonstrates how the two sets of 
rights follow a similar trajectory: Both started out weak and weakened further before starting to 
improve. By the late 1990s both sets were close to the ideal value.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Social instability 
We measure contestation by looking at social instability. The level of contestation (and social instability) 
is directly observable in the number of actions taken to repress social activism. Although some records 
about prosecutions under Apartheid were kept by the government, civil society organizations, especially 
the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), played a critical role. The indicators of social 
instability draw heavily on evidence kept by the SAIRR for the periods up to the end of Apartheid. Table 
3 provides the elements contained in the series.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
During the Apartheid era, social instability clearly increased as the limited property and political rights of 
the majority of the population became increasingly contested. Since the end of Apartheid, social 
instability has been a result primarily of the non-delivery of public services. Therefore the measure was 
updated from 1996 through to 2012 using data on public violence associated with some form of political 
activity (e.g. a clash between rival political factions would qualify for inclusion but not an armed 
robbery). Most of the violence was linked to the non-delivery of public services.  
In contrast to institutional indicators that represent some ideal type, instability takes place when 
societal conditions and constraints are challenged. Therefore both political and property rights are 
expressed as a value out of 100, with 100 reflecting the ideal, but the social instability index does not have 
an upper ceiling. Indeed, it is important to note that the high levels of instability are so high that they 
obscure substantial social unrest in the apparently more stable years. For example, the Social Change 
Research Unit of the University of Johannesburg  tracks community protests (typically on the non-delivery 
of services like housing and sanitation), and in 2010, 2011 and 2012 recorded 252, 206 and 470 protests 
respectively, with 3, 9 and 5 resultant deaths in each of the years. Yet on the graph (see Figure 2) it appears 
as if social instability had been largely resolved.  
Foreign Direct Investment 
We examine data on FDI obtained from South Africa’s central bank from 1956 to 2012. Because we are 
interested in the longer-term implications of shifts in FDI, we excluded portfolio investments from the 
analysis. We experimented both with normalizing OFDI and IFDI using 1960 values and with presenting 
them as a share of GDP, and observed substantively same the patterns. Figure 3 presents South African 
OFDI flows as a percentage of GDP. Three periods of increased outward FDI can be observed: 1980 to 
1985, 1994 to 2000 and 2003 to the end of the period under review.  
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[Figure 4 about here] 
In the overlay of OFDI/GDP and IFDI/GDP over the same time period (see Figure 4), a "smile" from 1985 
to 1998 when OFDI exceeds IFDI is noticeable. Even though 1985 marks a (relatively sharp) drop in OFDI 
relative to previous years, the drop in IFDI is even steeper. This change suggests not only a negative turn 
of events in South Africa, but also some form of containment of OFDI. That situation seems to persist until 
1999 when IFDI once again overtakes OFDI in size.  
EVIDENCE 
Stress: 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
In the case of South Africa, the stress phase lasted three decades. We demonstrate in this section how 
the conditions for escape FDI were created through weak institutions and contained social instability. 
Our evidence brings more nuance to the literature that argues that weak institutions trigger escape FDI 
(e.g. Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Luo & Wang, 2011; Peng & Parente, 2012). First, the South African case 
suggests that firms can choose to align with the local institutions, even when institutions may be weak. 
Second, the successful containment of instability limits the possibility of escape FDI, both by reassuring 
firms that the state is still in control, and by making it harder for firms to shift their holdings. Thus 
although the conditions may be ripening for escape FDI, very little such FDI is actually seen.  
It is clear that Apartheid was already legally embedded by 1956 when our analysis starts (Figure 
1). Both the political and property rights indices show the effects of a racial division where white South 
Africans had extensive rights, but the bulk of the population had very limited rights. Political rights 
steadily deteriorated from a highest value of 34 out of 100 in 1956 to a low point of 13 over the period 
1967 to 1976. Property rights fluctuated somewhat from a value of 37 out of 100 in 1956 until it reached 
a low point of 31 in 1976.  
In March 1960 the Sharpeville massacre took place when the police attacked demonstrators 
against pass laws, killing 69 and wounding 189. This incident destroyed the veneer of a consensus-driven 
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government, and triggered an intensification of social instability. The anti-pass campaign intensified to 
the extent that jails were overflowing with pass law “offenders” and the pass laws had to be suspended 
until later that year. A state of emergency was promulgated, and by May of 1960 more than 18000 
people had been imprisoned. By August, when it was repealed, more than 10500 were still in detention.  
In May 1961, the Apartheid government established South Africa as a republic and amidst 
strong disapproval from the United Nations and the Commonwealth, left the Commonwealth. Stringent 
exchange controls were imposed in June 1961 which prevented the repatriation by non-residents of the 
proceeds of securities sold in South Africa and prohibited South African residents from remitting funds 
abroad. A dual exchange rate system entailed the introduction of a “blocked Rand” for “non-residents” 
(whether a natural person or legal entity) and a “commercial Rand” for residents, with different rules 
resulting in funds in a blocked non-resident account being worth less than Rands in a resident account 
(Havemann, 2014). The 1961 Anglo American annual report refers to this explicitly as the cause of a 
“severe curtailment in the net outflow of private capital” (Pallister, Stewart & Lepper, 1988:95). 
In spite of the turmoil, during the 1960s and early 1970s, foreign assets in South Africa remained 
at around 30% of GDP (see Figure 3). There was a gradual decline between 1961 and 1964, likely due to 
the Sharpeville massacre. But the well-established relationship between risk and return also held, and 
foreign inflows soon resumed. Sampson (1987:87-88) maintains that MNCs “could not resist the prospects 
of rapid expansion and a return on investment averaging 15 percent by 1967 – far higher than in Europe.” 
Indeed, by 1968 South Africa had overtaken the USA as the third largest recipient of investment from 
Britain (excluding oil and financial services).  
However, international hostility to Apartheid endangered South Africa's export markets and 
hindered South Africa's ability to attract foreign capital and technology. This contributed to a fall in the 
growth rate from the end of the 1960s. Indeed, the median annual GDP growth in the 1970s was only 
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3.01% (in 1978) compared to more than double that for the 1960s, when the median annual GDP growth 
was 6.12% (in 1965).  
The next major incident of contestation was the 1976 Soweto riots when black students protested 
the compulsory teaching of Afrikaans in schools. This incident triggered increased violence on the side of 
both protestors and police, and extensive destruction of property was reported throughout the year. By 
1977, the budget for “defense” amounted to more than 18% of the total government budget and 
compulsory military service for white men had been increased from 12 to 24 months.  
IFDI had already seen a sharp drop in 1973, the year of the first oil shock and mass strikes in 
South Africa, and the 1976 riots accelerated the decrease in IFDI flows. Indeed, IFDI into South Africa 
would not increase again until 1990. Yet OFDI remained fairly constant at under 10% of GDP from 1956 
through to the early 1980s. (See Figure 4 for a composite view of all the indicators, with four eras 
highlighted with consecutive ovals.) 
[Figure 4 about here] 
This does not mean that South African business did not sense a potential threat in the 
instability. Domestically, there was a “growing convergence of views among capitalists about the rising 
costs and inconvenience of apartheid” (Lipton, 1985:227) from the 1970s. Lipton (1985) points out that 
as a result of job reservation based on color and the deliberate policy of under-educating the black 
population, South Africa had started to experience acute skill shortages. Businesses were also worried 
about the shortage of investment capital as a constraint on growth, as political concerns made foreign 
capital hard to come by (Jones & Inggs, 1999). 
Firms engaged in a variety of strategies to mitigate the perceived risks. In 1961 a predecessor of 
the current packaging company Nampak, Amalgamated Packaging Industries (API), consolidated its 
overseas holdings into the Canadian Overseas Packaging Industries (COPI). Hocking (1987:140) in his 
history of Nampak writes:  
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More than a few API employees suspected that the Kalmansons [main shareholders] were more 
interested in COPI than in API, especially as South Africa’s future remained in doubt.  
In 1975, Natie Kirsch, a major South African industrialist whose company Kimet was one of the four 
largest companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in the 1970s, bought Jetro, a New York-based 
distribution business for wholesalers. This interest appeared minor until 1986, when he sold Kimet, but 
managed to retain control of Jetro. Jetro, still in the US, remains the basis of his current wealth (Fife, 
2010).  
Similarly, when Anglo-American wished to purchase a stake in the Canadian mining company 
Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting, it could not fund the purchase from South Africa because of currency 
exchange restrictions and had to raise the funds in New York. Eventually, the South African exchange 
controls resulted in Anglo-American establishing its own overseas finance house in 1965.  Charter 
Consolidated was based in London and was a holding company for operations in the USA, Britain, 
Canada, France, and others. Within three years its market value almost rivalled the market value of 
Anglo-American itself (Pallister, Stewart & Lepper, 1988:95). Indeed, already in the 1960s there was an 
Anglo-American long-term plan “that within 25 years, South Africa will be turned into a country which 
can be controlled from the outside” (EIR, 1993: 127). 
Some companies – for example Barloworld in 1969, and the Afrikaans industrialist Anton Rupert 
in 1972 when he consolidated his international tobacco interests in Rothman’s International – listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. Although they continued to operate primarily from South Africa, the UK 
listings provided a potential escape route, should it be needed.  
Thus although OFDI did not increase during this period, the South African economy was clearly 
under stress. The apparent stability of OFDI can be attributed to the containment strategies of the 
government, comparable to the strengthening of a dam wall. Currency restrictions were put in place in 
1961, but civil liberties were restricted so that social instability by 1978 were at pre-Sharpeville levels. 
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This is in accordance with the predictions of the theory of failure: Although the consequences of the 
load on the economy were not yet visible, there was definitely stress.  
Stress was triggered firstly by the deteriorating institutions. For example, laws to deny a 
category of citizens the right to acquire marketable skills, the duplication of facilities to ensure racial 
segregation, and limitations to the economic activity of people of color all started to constrain the 
economy. Second, stress was present in the tremendous effort required to contain social contestation. 
We argue that those stressors created the conditions for escape FDI. Wary of what the future could 
bring, companies started making contingency plans in case it became necessary to reduce their 
exposure to the country. However, they had not yet decided that it was necessary to “escape”. We 
therefore suggest: 
Proposition 1 (Stress): The conditions for escape FDI are created by deteriorating institutions 
and contained periods of societal instability. 
Strain: 1980s 
The second phase of escape FDI took place during South Africa’s highly turbulent 1980s. We argue that 
not only intensifying periods of societal instability but also reforms to institutional arrangements result 
in the “strain” phase of escape FDI. It is intuitively clear why intensifying societal instability would result 
in some escape FDI, but the evidence from South Africa suggests that institutional reforms had a similar 
effect.  We argue that this is because even limited reforms introduce uncertainty by suggesting 
changeability in the institutional environment. Moreover, there is no knowing whether the changes will 
result in a more or a less business-friendly environment. Given the potential changes in “shape” or 
“form” of the home economy (“strain”), businesses may decide that it is prudent to acquire some 
interests outside of their home country. This results in some escape FDI, but at this stage, firms seek to 
diversify internationally rather than leave their home country.   
Reforms to the institutional arrangements in South Africa took place over the period from 1983 
to 1989 as pieces of Apartheid legislation were repealed. As from 1982, black South Africans in urban 
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areas were allowed to elect local authorities and from 1983 the “tricameral parliament” allowed for 
some political representation from “Coloured” and Indian South Africans. Some “petty Apartheid” 
measures were repealed, for example the prohibition on mixed marriages in 1985. Property rights also 
saw small improvements in the early 1980s, for example through the Black Communities Development 
Act (1984), which provided for the transfer of 99 year leasehold to “competent” black people, and the 
Group Areas Amendment Act (1984) that allowed for some “free trading zones”.  
Yet the 1980s were also characterized by levels of social instability not experienced before or 
since as most South Africans saw legal reforms during this period as attempts to hold on to (white) 
power by offering other South Africans limited rights (see Figure 2). The decade started with dozens of 
bombings at sites deemed central to the enforcement of Apartheid, such as courts, military bases, 
power plants (including South Africa’s only nuclear plant) and Sasol, a state-owned synthetic fuel 
company. These bombings were met with retaliatory raids, often in neighbouring countries. A number 
of laws were promulgated to contain widespread social action in the early 1980s, and were consolidated 
in a State of Emergency from 1985 onwards. Unlike with previous protest action (after Sharpeville and 
the Soweto riots), the levels of social instability increased rather than decreased in response to 
repressive legislation (Olivier, 1991).  
 Business also by now openly criticized Apartheid, and a series of meetings between officials of 
the still-banned ANC and not only South African academics and journalists, but increasingly also business 
leaders took place in the 1980s.  
In 1983, the financial Rand was abolished and non-residents could repatriate the majority of 
their South African investments via the commercial Rand. This changed when Botha’s infamous 
“Rubicon” speech in 1985 led to the collapse of the South African Rand. The dual (capital and financial 
Rand) system was immediately reintroduced and restrictions on capital expatriation substantially 
tightened. Restrictions were so draconian that there was a limit to the gold jewelry that South Africans 
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could take when travelling abroad (Havemann, 2014). 
 In terms of OFDI, the effects of currency controls are clear: Substantial funds were leaving the 
country during the brief relaxation of exchange controls in 1983 and 1984, and outflows halted abruptly 
with the tightening of exchange controls in 1985. Yet even the very strict controls could not bring OFDI 
down to pre-1983 levels. During this phase IFDI also plummeted as global sanctions were imposed and 
foreign investors fled the country, and in 1985 OFDI exceeded IFDI for the first time.  
Companies engaged in complex workarounds to allow them to escape the country. Anglo-
American (which in 1985 controlled more than 50% of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) created the 
holding company Minorco which in 1981 became the largest foreign investor in the USA. Indeed, by 
1988 almost half of Minorco’s investment was in the USA. Through a series of deals and mergers the 
family controlling Anglo-American, the Oppenheimers, secured a 27% stake in the largest private 
investment bank in the USA and the world’s largest bond-trading firm, the Salomon Brothers. A 1982 US 
Department of Commerce report on publically available information identified the Oppenheimer family 
as owning nearly $1,000 million in 18 American companies (Pallister, Stewart & Lepper, 1988).  
In 1987, Sappi, the paper and pulp producer, managed to acquire the South African interests of 
the British-owned Courtaulds and its subsidiary Saiccor as the British firm wanted to divest from the 
country. Through complex and secretive negotiations (eventually concluded through 56 separate 
agreements) Sappi was able to secure not only Saiccor and Courtauld’s productive capacity, but also 
Courtauld’s global distribution facilities (Hocking, 2012). Given the drop in local demand, exporting was 
essential for the survival of Sappi.  
In another example, the South African conglomerate Barloworld, having listed on the London 
Stock Exchange in 1969, in 1985 acquired J Bibby & Sons. In the words of a financial journalist, J Bibby & 
Sons was “a relatively obscure English company”. Importantly though, he argues that in those days it 
was the vehicle through which the company did its business in Europe (Bruce, 2012).  
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Similarly, in 1986 the well-established South African insurer Old Mutual bought the entire share 
capital of a small UK life office. In addition to a “mediocre life office” in the UK, Providence Capital had 
an international division based in Guernsey. That division was used to form the basis of the Old Mutual 
International platform (Cranston, 2012).  
A competitor, Liberty Life, had managed to grow exponentially through acquiring the assets of 
foreign insurers that were leaving the South African market over the 1970s and into the 1980s. In 1980 
the founder of Liberty Life, Donald Gordon, set up a subsidiary named TransAtlantic Holdings and 
started looking for an international acquisition. When 9.3% of the British insurer Sun Life became 
available, Gordon purchased it, and over time increased the TransAtlantic shareholding to 29%, and in 
1985 through TransAtlantic also acquired the UK-based property company Capital and Counties. 
TransAtlantic listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange in 1987 and in 1992 on the London Stock 
Exchange after obtaining full control of Capital and Counties (Jones, 2010). 
Having become fully South African when Standard Chartered divested in 1986, Standard Bank’s 
“first move” was to form “Standard Bank London” in 1992, primarily to facilitate access to the funds 
available in the Western world (Paul, 2012). Indeed, although scholarship suggested that the political 
effects of sanctions were limited (Levy, 1999), a number of South African firms made useful acquisitions 
during the 1980s. 
These examples demonstrate how South African firms were seeking out investment 
opportunities abroad. The sustained stress on the economy was starting to result in observable strain. 
Given the high levels of social instability – increasingly often accompanied by violence – as well as the 
sluggish growth (2.2% over the decade), it was hardly surprising that firms were trying to escape the 
country. Yet government was still able to contain the actions of business, if increasingly less often those 
of the general population. The strict exchange controls limited the extent to which South African 
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companies were able to move funds out of the country. Companies dealt with this restraint by setting 
up holding companies in stable, advanced economies, typically in the UK and Europe.  
In highlighting the various manifestations of firms with South African ties, Goldstein and 
Prichard (2009:250) state that "considerable caution must be exercised when deciding what can, and 
cannot, be considered a South African firm". We believe that this is not incidental. During the 1980s, as 
the country was struggling both politically and economically, the South African government expected its 
firms to stay at home. And given global anti-Apartheid sentiment and sanctions, firms were not 
particularly welcome abroad either. When South African firms internationalized, they did so covertly.  
In terms of an analogy, the failure of a dam is again useful. Under strain, some breaches become 
apparent. However, numerous reinforcement activities are undertaken to secure the dam, and through 
them, the leakage is minimized. In the context of business, containment activities include government 
censure of firms that go abroad, and especially limiting the expatriation of local funds and restricting 
access to foreign currency. This leads us to suggest that the incremental reforms and intensifying 
contestation represent the start of escape FDI, but that it will initially be limited. We propose:  
Proposition 2 (Strain): Limited escape FDI results from inadequate reforms to institutional 
arrangements and/or intensifying periods of societal instability. 
Failure: 1990s 
We argue that the final phase of the cumulative process of escape FDI takes place when the productive 
capacity of the country has been rendered, in essence, unrecognizable. This can be because of 
fundamental changes in institutional arrangements, for example in Cuba in 1965, with the revolution in 
Iran in 1979 and in the Soviet Union and South Africa in the 1990s  
The South African case demonstrates clearly that escape FDI is driven not so much by weak 
institutions as much as by rapidly changing institutions. South Africa in the 1990s was a better place 
than in the 1980s. Yet the rapid changes in institutions in the 1990s triggered a flood of escape FDI as 
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firms sought to dramatically reduce their exposure to the country. We argue that this occurred because 
businesses can adapt to institutional conditions if they are known, but not when change is too rapid.  
President FW De Klerk’s 1990 announcement of the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela 
and unbanning of all political parties, including the ANC, represents such a rapid, dramatic change. 
Virtually overnight, social instability ceased. In 1994 the first democratically elected government started 
its work, and over the next few years, political and property rights were restored until the 1996 
constitution resulted in a rights regime that can be described as normal. At first glance, it appears as if 
South Africa was experiencing ideal conditions. Yet this positivity is not borne out by either the OFDI or 
IFDI data. On the contrary, although the strict exchange controls with the financial Rand were only 
abolished in 1995, there was a steady increase in OFDI throughout the 1990s. Moreover, IFDI remained 
well below OFDI levels until 1999.   
We argue that this apparent anomaly can be explained by the fact that escape FDI is a 
cumulative response not only to contestation, but also to institutional misalignment. The new ANC 
government had made pro-socialist statements, and businesses were concerned about the new South 
African government following a similar nationalization agenda as other post-colonial African 
governments.  
Moreover, a number of businesses had managed to develop ways of working with the Apartheid 
government. Sol Kerzner, the hotel magnate and founder of Sun International, developed the Sun City 
resort in 1979 in a black “homeland” (similar to a Native American reservation), in which gambling was 
legal. Sun City attracted extensive criticism from anti-Apartheid activists, but was a commercial success. 
Once negotiations about the end of Apartheid started, Kerzner limited new investments in South Africa. 
(His next major South African investment would be the Cape Town One&Only hotel, launched in 2009.) 
Instead, in 1994 Kerzner bought what would become Atlantis in the Bahamas, and in 1996 developed 
the Mohegan Sun in Connecticut in the US.  
28 
 
Similarly, the media firm Naspers initially started as an Afrikaans media company, and long 
worked closely with the Apartheid government. Naspers was for example able to launch the first pay TV 
station in South Africa in 1986 by agreeing to limit news content (Uys-Allie, 2010). With the advent of 
democracy, Naspers wanted to get into the European pay TV market. But having long benefited from its 
relationship with the Apartheid government, it had not developed a European base from which it could 
orchestrate international expansion. In 1995 Naspers entered into a partnership with Richemont, the 
foreign affiliate of the South African Rupert family, in order to acquire FilmNet, a pay TV station that 
operated in northern Europe. In 1999 the station was sold to the French company Chanel+ (Uys-Allie, 
2010).  
The Naspers example highlights a pattern that is found among a long list of South African 
companies. In the 1990s, investment went primarily to advanced economies, Europe and increasingly 
also North America. Long before the dual exchange system was abolished, numerous South African firms 
had acquired an international holding company or subsidiary that they could use to facilitate 
internationalization. And even when a firm did not yet have an international base, by now a large 
network of personal and historical ties existed that could support internationalization (Goldstein & 
Prichard, 2009).  
In the case of Naspers, the Rupert family facilitated internationalization, as in fact the Ruperts 
did for a number of Afrikaans-owned companies. The international expansion of the fast food chain 
Nando’s to Australia in 1990 and the UK in 1990 was made possible with support from Dick Enthoven, 
co-founder of the large insurer Hollards (Motloung, 2010). The technology company Dimension Data 
(acquired in 2011 by Nippon) started its international expansion with the acquisition of ComTech, an 
Australia-based company that was founded by a South Africa-born and educated entrepreneur 
(Bannerman, 2012). 
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While these personal networks were important, by the 1990s, many South African MNCs had set 
up a base to allow them to circumvent exchange controls. The paper and pulp company Sappi in 1992 
acquired the German-based Hannover Papier and in 1994 the US-based SD Warren. The logistics firm 
Imperial acquired the Europe-based logistics division of ThyssenKrupp in 1999. Barlow Rand unbundled 
in 1993, and in 1995 to 1998 (renamed “Barloworld”) expanded its interests in the US, UK, Spain, 
Portugal and Australia. Biddy & Sons, the UK vehicle used for the transactions, was bought out in 1997 
and renamed Barloworld Holdings.  
Escape of course carries with it the implication that not just FDI but in fact entire firms can leave 
the country. This takes place when the headquarters of the firm shift to a new location, and indeed, 
evidence of "migrating multinationals" suggests that a number of South Africa's largest firms did so 
towards the end of the 1990s (Barnard, 2014). In 1999 Anglo-American merged with its international 
holding arm, Minorco, and shifted its primary listing to the London Stock Exchange. South African 
Breweries had been unusual in its pursuit of the wider African market even during the 1990s (Luiz, 
Stringfellow & Jefthas, 2017) when most South African MNCs pursued opportunities in the advanced 
economies, but together with the insurer Old Mutual, South African Breweries moved its headquarters 
and listing to London in 1999. In 2000, the technology firm Dimension Data followed suit.  
We argue that the OFDI of the 1990s represents escape as the main motive for 
internationalization. Despite continued currency controls, OFDI continued to increase, and in fact, after 
the abolishment of exchange controls in 1995, in 1996 recorded its highest levels ever. Firms were 
overwhelmingly choosing host locations in stable economies even when they were mature markets, and 
some firms shifted their primary exchange listing to advanced economies. All these factors suggest that 
firms were apprehensive about the changes to South Africa.  
In a sense, the profound changes in South Africa had not only given rise to fears about a possible 
misalignment between firms and the new government, but perhaps more importantly, the sense that 
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government was in control had been lost. The immediate and dramatic cessation of political violence as 
soon as Nelson Mandela was released, the overwhelming majority (just short of two-thirds) with which 
the (black-led) ANC had been elected in 1994, the damning evidence of the (white) government-
sponsored violence coming from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission from 1996 onwards, and 
growing state debt levels all limited the effectiveness with which government could direct or contain 
investment.  
If escape FDI is understood as a cumulative process, firms can be expected to respond 
differently to contained, and then intensifying, and finally pervasive societal instability. Similarly, the 
home country is perceived as increasingly risky when firms need to operate in a context with 
deteriorating institutions, where institutions are undergoing wavering and inadequate reforms, up to 
where there is far-reaching institutional change. The process is not irreversible, and it is not inevitable 
that the final phase of escape FDI, failure, will take place. But where firms are confronted with changes 
that not only render their home country virtually unrecognizable, but specifically cause doubt about the 
future productive capacity of its economy, the known risks of internationalization may seem less 
important. Under such conditions of “failure”, we propose: 
Proposition 3 (Failure): Extensive escape FDI results from fundamental changes in institutional 
arrangements and/or pervasive societal instability.  
In terms of the analogy from before, escape FDI occurs when the “dam” fails. This dam failure can take 
place when societal instability becomes so widespread that not even executives can insulate themselves 
from it, or when institutional changes are so fundamental that there is almost inevitably misalignment 
between existing business interests and the new institutional regime. Unlike in the institutional strain 
phase, very little can be done to deal with “breaches” in the dam: When there is institutional “failure”, 
escape FDI becomes pervasive. Table 4 summarizes our argument, explaining the mechanisms driving 
each phase and showing how one South African MNC, Barloworld, progressed through the phases.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Market-seeking FDI: 2000 onwards 
It is perhaps useful to comment also on the final wave of OFDI evident from the data. We argue that this 
does not represent escape FDI, but instead South Africa’s successful (re-)integration into the 
international economy. A new "dam" had been constructed. There were new but known "rules of the 
game" and government increasingly appeared pro-business, especially with the adoption of the market-
friendly GEAR (Growth, Employment And Redistribution) policy in 1996. IFDI jumped sharply in 1999 to 
almost 40% of GDP as the fiscal deficit fell from almost 10% of GDP in 1993 to under 3% by 1999, making 
clear government’s commitment to prudent economic policy. From 2000 there were major increases in 
both IFDI and OFDI.  
Between 2001 and 2006, South African firms focused on domestic opportunities, as high 
domestic economic growth (about 5% per annum) was fueled by the demand of a rising black middle 
class. However, an increasing number of South African firms started exploiting the opportunities on the 
African continent: Naspers used the proceeds from its sale of Europe-based interest FilmNet to launch 
pay TV in Africa, Barloworld started expanding into mineral-rich African regions like Zambia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Hollard expanded insurance products to neighboring countries like 
Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia, and Imperial launched an African Division in 2011.  
The enthusiastic comments by the CEOs of South African businesses about possible global 
opportunities that became a feature of financial reporting in this era are borne out by the quantitative 
evidence: by 2012 more than 20% of the OFDI from South Africa went to wider Africa, compared to 
about 5% in 1999. A similar proportion went to Asia, up from a negligible proportion at the end of the 
1990s. In terms of the motives for internationalization, it seems that the vast majority of investments 
were market-seeking.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
It has long been hard to find robust evidence for escape FDI, and our study confirms Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Narula’s point about firm motives that “being truthful may have costs” (2015:9). Firms that engage in 
escape FDI experience their institutional environment as uncertain, and they are likely to face resistance 
in getting their capital to another country. Rather than risk contesting their government, they may find it 
easier to highlight the pull motives of their proposed new host locations. After all, the economies to 
which firms typically relocate when they engage in escape FDI tend to be not only stable, but also 
characterized by a range of created assets.  
We therefore believe that this paper demonstrates the value of a historical approach. The 
historical evidence allows us to demonstrate how FDI responds to institutional and social changes over 
time. While few business leaders explicitly articulate a concern with escape, other evidence (for 
example, responses to the relaxing of exchange controls) suggests that escape was a prominent motive 
for their internationalization. Moreover, the time-based analysis allows us to demonstrate how the 
cumulative process of institutional misalignment and contestation went through phases of stress, strain 
and finally failure.  
This paper consequently contributes a more robust and analytically precise understanding of 
escape FDI to the literature. We argue that it is a particularly appropriate concept to describe the 
relatively rare but economically consequential cases of "dam failure", and suggest that escape FDI takes 
place when unknown future institutional arrangements, i.e. “rules of the game”, cause concern about 
the continued productive capacity of the economy to such an extent that firms seek to move outside the 
borders of the home country.  
Our work has important implications for future scholarship on escape FDI. Implicit in the work of 
many of the scholars who suggest that escape FDI takes place when there are weak institutions (e.g. Liu, 
Buck & Shu, 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007; Stal & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011) is the suggestion that firms have 
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somehow “outgrown” the local context. We suggest that scholarship can advance more precisely if the 
misalignment with rather than weakness of institutions is emphasized. Moreover, in many cases, firms 
that have been studied are in the stress or at most strain phases of FDI. We suggest that an explicitly 
phased approach to theorizing escape FDI will allow scholars to acknowledge similarity between firms 
that are internationalizing to “explore for better sources of advantage and avoid the poor conditions of 
the home country" (Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula & Un, 2015:31), but importantly to also allow appropriate 
distinctions to be made between different levels of severity of the challenges that firms face.  
An important research question raised by this paper relates to the consequences of escape FDI 
both for the escaping firms and for the home country. Goldstein and Prichard (2009) try to unpack the 
capabilities that allowed South African firms to internationalize, but concede that many South African 
firms struggled abroad, especially in the advanced European markets. Luiz et al. (2017) argue that South 
African firms initially succeeded in host countries which demonstrated institutional complementarity 
with their home environment. For example, two of the four pioneers on the London Stock Exchange 
during the "failure" period, Dimension Data and Old Mutual, were nearly bankrupted by the experience. 
In terms of consequences for the home country, it is noteworthy that although all four firms retain a 
non-trivial presence in South Africa, they have cut back on value-adding activities like R&D at home.  
But while it appears that many South African MNCs engaged in flight rather than in a considered 
strategic decision to use or acquire capabilities elsewhere, it is also known that firms from less 
developed countries learn from their international experience (Rabbiosi, Elia & Bertoni, 2012). From 
2000 onwards, South African firms were well positioned to benefit from the pro-market reforms in many 
African countries, and it seems likely that their previous international experience, even though it may 
have been motivated by the desire to escape, will have been of benefit. Yet will that have been the case 
if the transition to a democratic South Africa had failed? Additional scholarship is needed to explain 
whether and how escape FDI affects the actual productive capacity of the economy. 
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Prior research on a range of countries can be reinterpreted in the light of our propositions. For 
example, Jones’s study of British trading companies provides a number of examples of firms that had 
"successfully escaped from 'difficult' host countries to more attractive areas" (Jones, 2000:130). He 
offers examples from across the world, and it is clear when and whether firms are experiencing stress, 
strain or failure conditions. Hong Kong demonstrates typical "strain" conditions in that some but limited 
escape FDI was taking place with the handover to China. Thus in 1984 Jardine Matheson moved its 
primary domicile to Bermuda and in 1991 its primary stock exchange listing to London. In the late 1980s 
it sold some of its Asian assets and diversified into the UK with interests in retail, construction and 
(unsuccessfully) electricity provision (Jones, 2000:334). However, many of the post-colonial economic 
shifts, for example the Dutch companies leaving Indonesia in 1957 in response to nationalization policies 
(Jones, 2000:153), can be described as cases of "failure" as firms respond to the doubtful future 
productive capacity of the economy under new "rules of the game". 
Even within a single country, a cycle of stress-stain-failure can repeat. We decided to conclude 
our empirical analysis in 2012 because it seems to mark the start of a new era in South Africa 
(Alexander, 2013). Under the presidency of Jacob Zuma, government corruption reached such levels 
that the term “state capture” became commonplace1. The responses of firms to this new era are 
consistent with our propositions, and by 2017, South African firms were experiencing renewed strain. 
For example, Naspers in 2017 traded at a discount of nearly 40% – due to "political challenges", 
according to its CFO – but could not shift its primary listing because of exchange controls2.   
It is perhaps useful to return to Johann Rupert and Cyril Ramaphosa, whose exchange was 
quoted at the beginning of the paper. Rupert benefited hugely from the increased openness of the 
South African economy post-Apartheid. But his own wealth, coupled with the broken promises to and 
                                                          
1 See http://www.gupta-leaks.com/, accessed January 17, 2018 
2 See https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/2017-12-14-naspers-rules-out-change-in-listing/, accessed 
January 17, 2018 
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desperate poverty of the majority of South Africans, led to him being branded the face of “white 
monopoly capital”3. In turn, Ramaphosa was elected the new president of the ANC, and became 
President of South Africa in 2018. In January he attended Davos where he stated:  
We will be dealing with the regulatory environment and all those matters and difficulties that 
have been impeding investment coming through to South Africa: we will address them. The 
most important thing is that we will be seeking to build consensus. We will be a conference of 
the governing parties that go out, build consensus amongst key role players in our economy, go 
and build, and put together a social compact4.  
This paper has theorized the role of institutional misalignment and societal contestation in triggering 
failure in the economy. In the hope of restoring confidence in South Africa, Ramaphosa reinforces a 
mirror image: an institutional realignment and a “social compact” among key role players in the South 
African economy. As much as those factors can be expected to attract IFDI, in this paper we 
demonstrate that their absence will trigger escape FDI. 
  
                                                          
3 See https://www.biznews.com/sa-investing/2016/12/02/johann-rupert-gupta-bell-pottinger/, and 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html, accessed February 
8, 2018 
4 See https://www.biznews.com/wef/davos-2018/2018/01/25/ramaphosa-off-piste-davos-straight-
talk/?acid=3zb4IjSAzwseZeuwhd4cWQ%3D%3D&adid=7xmxa7aLJIgQ9pc0JfeOsA%3D%3D&date=2018-01-26, 
accessed February   8, 2018 
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Table 1: Some important laws characterizing the South African Apartheid era  
Date Law Effect 
1936 
1945 
Bantu Trust and Land Act  
Bantu Urban Areas 
Consolidation 
Regulation of the movement of Black people within urban 
areas 
1948 National Party comes to power on an Apartheid mandate 
1949 
 
1950 
1953 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Act 
Immorality Amendment Act 
Group Areas Act 
Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act 
Limitation of contact between racial groups by making it 
illegal to have relations across different races, to live in 
the same area or use the same public amenities such as 
schools or hospitals 
1950 
1953 
1954 
Suppression of Communism Act 
Public Safety Act 
Riotous Assemblies and 
Suppression of Communism Act 
Repression of resistance to Apartheid by banning a range 
of organizations termed “communist” and disallowing 
public protests 
1956 
 
Riotous Assemblies Act 
Separate Representation of 
Voters Act 
Prohibition of Interdicts 
Intensification of legislation in order to repress resistance 
to Apartheid, including making legal recourse to forced 
removals illegal 
1957 
1959 
Section 16 of the Immorality Act 
Extension of University 
Education Act 
Intensification of legislation to limit contact between 
racial groups, including barring sexual relations or 
attending university together 
1960 
1961 
Unlawful Organizations Act 
Indemnity Act 
Suppression of resistance to Apartheid, including by 
providing indemnity to any employees or leaders in 
government for action taken during the violent anti-
Apartheid protests 
1959 
 
1969 
Promotion of Bantu Self-
government Act 
Separate Representation of 
Voters Amendment Act 
Removal of parliamentary representation for Blacks and 
Coloureds respectively 
1963 
1967 
General Law Amendment Act 
Terrorism Act 
Legalization of detention without trial 
1968 Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act 
Limitation on different political organizations to 
collaborate, designed to limit multi-racial resistance to 
Apartheid 
1970 Bantu Homelands Citizenship 
Act 
Removal of citizenship of South Africa from blacks and 
reassigning it to one of the ethnic “homelands” 
1977 Indemnity Act Suppression of resistance to Apartheid by providing 
indemnity to any employees or leaders in government for 
action taken during the violent anti-Apartheid protests 
1982 Internal Security Act Consolidation of all previous laws to repress resistance to 
Apartheid, including the banning of undesirable 
organizations, publications, people and public gatherings, 
and of detention without trial 
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Date Law Effect 
1982 
1983 
Black Local Authorities Act 
Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 
Offer of limited power for the first time to South Africans 
of color: To local authorities for Blacks and to Coloureds 
and Indians through participation in a tri-cameral 
parliament (with the dominant White chamber of 
parliament) 
1985 
 
1986  
Immorality and Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Amendment 
Act 
Identification Act - repealed 
Abolition of Influx Control Act – 
repealed 
Abolishment of what was termed “petty Apartheid”, e.g. 
laws limiting movement of black people in non-black 
areas or relationship across races 
1985 
1986 
State of Emergency 
National State of Emergency 
First only in 36 of 270 magisterial districts, later country-
wide and intensified: Curfews, restrictions on political 
funerals, banning of organizations and meetings, 
restrictions on media coverage  
1990 Unbanning of the ANC First meaningful change towards full political association 
1990 
 
1991 
Discriminatory Legislation 
regarding Public Amenities 
Repeal Act 
Abolition of Racially Based Land 
Measures Act 
Population Registration Act 
Repeal Act  
Abolishment of some essential components of Apartheid, 
e.g. where people could use public amenities or buy 
property. The act requiring the racial classification of all 
citizens was repealed, although the registry of racial 
categorization remained until 1994  
1996 South African Constitution Establishment of universal non-racial political rights 
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Table 2: Socio-political and economic context of South Africa, 1956 to 2012  
Executive 
head of 
state* 
Socio-political context  Economic context 
1954 – 1958 
National Party 
Prime 
Minister 
Hans Strijdom 
 
• SA is still a dominion of the British 
Empire.  
• Republican fervor after the 300-year 
anniversary of Dutch arrivals to the 
country enables Strijdom to remove the 
Union Jack, God Save The Queen and 
”On His Majesty’s Service” from 
government events and 
communications.  
• The black-dominated trade union 
movement gains momentum with the 
founding of South African Congress of 
Trade Unions. 
• The ANC adopts the “Freedom Charter”, 
laying out its foundational principles. The 
preamble reads:  
We, the People of South Africa, declare 
for all our country and the world to 
know: that South Africa belongs to all 
who live in it, black and white, and that 
no government can justly claim authority 
unless it is based on the will of all the 
people. 
• The 1950s and 60s see a period 
of relatively high economic 
growth, low inflation, controlled 
fiscal spending, and increasing 
industrialization. 
• Relatively robust average 
economic growth of 5.02% p.a. 
over this period is experienced. 
• Good macroeconomic conditions 
are seen with a low average 
inflation rate of 2.68% p.a., and a 
contained budget deficit of -
2.77% of GDP. 
• A policy of import substituting 
industrialization is promoted. 
 
1958 – 1966 
National Party 
Prime 
Minister 
HF Verwoerd 
 
• The UK Prime Minister highlights UK 
discomfort with SA’s racial policies with 
his “winds of change” speech. 
• SA becomes a republic and withdraws 
from the Commonwealth.  
• Verwoerd bans the ANC and other black 
political organizations.  
• The ANC goes underground and decides 
to pursue armed resistance 
• 69 people are killed by security forces 
with the Sharpeville massacre.  
• Verwoerd is assassinated by a mixed-
race clerk in parliament.  
• “Separate development” along 
racial groupings is administered 
through the Homeland system. 
• The role of the public sector in 
the economy increases.  
• Average economic growth of 
5.13% p.a. is maintained. 
• Average inflation rate of 2.26% 
p.a. and a budget deficit of  
-2.73% of GDP indicates 
relatively prudent 
macroeconomic policy. 
 
1966 – 1978 
National Party 
Prime 
Minister 
John Vorster 
 
• African decolonization accelerates and 
reaches SA’s neighboring states.  
• Rhodesia attempts to shore up white 
rule with the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence and Portugal withdraws 
from Mozambique and Angola. 
• The oil crisis of 1973 results in 
labor unrest. 
• Government reconsiders import-
substituting industrialization. 
• Vorster initiates the South 
African armament industry. 
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Executive 
head of 
state* 
Socio-political context  Economic context 
• Vorster orders military operations in 
Namibia, Angola and Zambia. 
• Military conscription becomes 
compulsory for white men. 
• Fourteen heads of African states release 
the Lusaka Manifesto in which they 
pledge support for banned anti-
Apartheid organizations. 
• Various countries suspend cultural and 
sports agreements with SA. 
• Killings of anti-Apartheid activists 
increase. 
• The macro-economic costs of 
apartheid become more 
apparent with a growth 
slowdown.  
• Macroeconomic conditions 
worsen over this period with an 
average economic growth of 
3.78% p.a., inflation at 7.49% 
p.a., and a budget deficit of -
3.73% of GDP. 
 
1978 – 1989 
National Party 
Prime 
Minister 
(1978 – 1984) 
State 
President 
(1984 – 1989) 
PW Botha 
 
• Mass civil society unrest occurs as anti-
Apartheid actions are increasingly well-
coordinated.  
• Trade unions arrange in confederations 
and coordinate anti-Apartheid actions.  
• The United Democratic Front is 
established to coordinate the actions of 
churches, civic associations, trade 
unions, student organizations, sports 
bodies and others to oppose Apartheid. 
• School boycotts under the slogan 
“liberation before education” become 
widespread. 
• Botha drives a secret nuclear weapons 
program.  
• Botha funds a “third force” to stoke 
conflict within black communities.  
• The rising economic costs of 
apartheid put pressure on the 
fiscus with increasing debt levels. 
• Defense spending increases to 
22% of national spending as 
resistance mounts both 
domestically and regionally. 
• South African business enters 
talks with exiled ANC. 
• SA’s international isolation 
increases with international 
sanctions and disinvestment  
• Macroeconomic conditions 
deteriorate substantially with an 
average economic growth of 
2.43% p.a., inflation of 14.19% 
p.a., and a ballooning budget 
deficit of -4.89% of GDP. 
State 
President 
FW de Klerk 
1989 – 1994  
National Party 
• De Klerk unbans the ANC and frees 
Mandela after 27 years in prison.  
• Twenty-seven political organizations and 
government representatives sign the 
National Peace Accord, paving the way 
for negotiations about ending Apartheid.  
• De Klerk dismantles SA’s nuclear 
weapons. 
• The global community starts reengaging 
with SA. 
• Various ANC members return from exile 
to assume leadership positions. 
• The assassination of Chris Hani, leader of 
the SA Communist Party, nearly leads to 
• Economic collapse is imminent as 
result of an economic slowdown 
and rapidly increasing debt 
levels.  
• The economic costs of apartheid 
become clearly unsustainable.  
• Macroeconomic conditions 
worsen further as economic 
growth averages barely in the 
positive territory (0.57% p.a.), 
and high inflation persists 
(12.83% p.a.), whilst the budget 
deficit balloons to -6.78% of GDP 
45 
 
Executive 
head of 
state* 
Socio-political context  Economic context 
the breakdown of the process of 
negotiation.  
(reaching 9% towards the end of 
this period). 
President 
Nelson 
Mandela 
1994 – 1999 
African 
National 
Congress 
• The ANC wins the first democratic 
elections with close to a two-thirds 
majority. 
• SA rejoins international bodies like the 
Commonwealth, World Health 
Organization and United Nations as well 
as various international sporting bodies. 
• The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, chaired by Nobel laureate 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, is established 
to deal with crimes under Apartheid. 
• SA’s progressive constitution is signed 
into law. 
• The Constitutional Court outlaws the 
death penalty. 
• Reintegration of South Africa 
into the global economy and 
liberalization of the economy. 
• Economic focus on meeting basic 
needs of those previously 
deprived under apartheid and 
the equitable distribution of 
public spending.  
• Some improvement is seen in 
macroeconomic conditions and 
reducing debt levels with an 
average economic growth rate of 
2.68% p.a., inflation falling to 
7.62% p.a., and the budget 
deficit being reduced to -4.31% 
of GDP on average. 
President 
Thabo Mbeki 
1999 – 2008 
African 
National 
Congress 
• Mbeki assumes a leading role as 
diplomat in Africa. 
• The first major post-Apartheid 
corruption scandal is exposed, an arms 
deal championed by Mbeki.  
• Mbeki attracts widespread criticism for 
his AIDS denialism and slow action in 
authorizing treatment as HIV infection 
rates among pregnant women increase 
from 22% to 30%.  
• SA engages in “quiet diplomacy” with 
Mugabe, while millions of Zimbabweans 
flee to SA as the Zimbabwean economy 
collapses.  
• Xenophobic attacks leave 42 foreigners 
dead and thousands displaced.  
• Zuma, the deputy-president, is 
implicated in corruption changes and 
(unsuccessfully) tried for rape.  
• The GEAR (Growth, Employment 
And Redistribution) policy with a 
focus on stabilization, reduction 
of debt, and market reforms are 
implemented. 
• The emphasis increasingly moves 
to increasing public investment 
and infrastructure spending in 
later years.  
• Macroeconomic conditions 
improve substantially with a 
mini-boom with average 
economic growth of 4.00% p.a. 
(the highest since the 1960s), 
and the inflation rate falling 
further to 5.92% p.a.  
• Most impressive is the reduction 
in the budget deficit to -0.57% of 
GDP with surpluses being 
experienced towards the end of 
the period. 
President 
(caretaking 
after Zuma 
became 
• Longtime ANC leader Lekota founds the 
Congress of the People in opposition to 
the selection of Zuma as president. 
• Various economic plans are 
introduced with conflicting 
agendas, indicative of the 
contested economic policy and 
the rise of populist agendas. 
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Executive 
head of 
state* 
Socio-political context  Economic context 
president of 
the ANC) 
Kgalema 
Motlanthe 
2008 – 2009;  
 
President 
Jacob Zuma 
2009 – 2012 
African 
National 
Congress 
• The government introduces the large-
scale provision for anti-retrovirals for 
HIV-infected South Africans. 
• The Nkandla scandal highlights Zuma’s 
use of state funds for the development 
of his private residence. 
• Zuma lambasts “clever blacks” for 
valuing Western society over traditional 
customs.  
• Malema, the leader of the ANC Youth 
League, is expelled from the ANC for not 
honoring instructions from the party. He 
founds a new political party, the 
Economic Freedom Fighter in 2013.  
• The Marikana massacre takes place.  
• Growing corruption and 
problems of governance within 
state-owned enterprises is 
experienced. 
• Large-scale electricity blackouts 
take place. 
• South Africa is severely affected 
by the economic crisis worldwide 
with deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions as 
economic growth averages only 
2.04% p.a., whilst the inflation 
rate and budget deficit worsen to 
6.70% p.a. and -3.86% of GDP 
respectively. 
*Until the 1983 constitutional change, there was both an executive and a largely ceremonial head of 
state. Until South Africa became independent from the UK in 1961, the ceremonial head of state was 
the Governor-General, and from 1961 to 1984, the State President fulfilled that role. In 1984 the State 
President became an executive role, and in 1994, the term changed to President.  
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Table 3: Constituent elements of social instability 
1. The number of people proscribed and/or banned for political reasons 
2. The number of people placed in detention 
3. The number of political fatalities 
4. The number of organizations officially banned 
5. The number of actions against “riots” 
6. Declarations of official states of emergency 
7. The number of publications subjected to censorship 
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Table 4: Dynamics underlying escape FDI 
Phase Proposition  Mechanism Example 
Stress Contained periods of 
societal instability 
and weakening 
institutions start to 
create the conditions 
for escape FDI.  
Misalignment of institutions with the 
expectations of business become evident, 
and some social instability is experienced 
although contained. Firms note this, but 
do little other than listing or acquiring 
some assets abroad. OFDI is not much 
affected.  
Barloworld acquires a 
secondary listing on 
the London Stock 
Exchange in 1969.  
Strain Intensifying periods 
of societal instability 
and/or inadequate 
reforms to 
institutional 
arrangements result 
in limited escape FDI. 
Institutional misalignment becomes so 
severe that reforms are attempted, and it 
seems increasingly unlikely that societal 
resistance can be contained. Escape FDI is 
triggered, and OFDI starts rising as firms 
increase their presence abroad.  
Barloworld uses its 
London Stock Exchange 
listing to acquire J 
Bibby & Sons in 1985. 
Fail Pervasive societal 
instability and/or the 
fundamental 
misalignment of 
institutional 
arrangements result 
in extensive escape 
FDI.  
In an analogous way to a dam failing, 
institutions collapse. The state proves 
incapable of controlling societal tensions, 
necessitating the large-scale redesign of 
national institutions. A veritable flood of 
OFDI leaves the country as firms seek to 
limit their exposure to the turbulent 
home country. OFDI may resemble 
market-seeking FDI, but firms seek out 
stable host environments, and shun 
investment in the home region.  
Barloworld uses J Biddy 
& Sons as vehicle to 
expand its interests in 
the US, UK, Spain, 
Portugal and Australia 
between 1995 and 
1998. Biddy & Sons is 
bought out in 1997 and 
renamed Barloworld 
Holdings.  
Post 
escape 
FDI 
 As the new institutional arrangements are 
bedded down and relative stability is 
reestablished, firms have greater 
confidence in the local context. OFDI 
increasingly takes place in the home 
region, and traditional market-seeking 
motives and markets can be observed.   
Barloworld launches a 
Logistics Division in 
South Africa in 2001, 
acquires first part and 
by 2004 full ownership 
of Avis South Africa, 
and starts expanding 
into mineral-rich 
African regions like 
Zambia, Ghana and the 
DRC. 
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Figure 1: Institutional metrics: Political and property rights index 
 
 Source: Fedderke et al., 2001, extended to 2012 
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Figure 2: Social instability 
 
Source: Fedderke et al., 2001, extended to 2012 
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Figure 3: Outward and inward FDI as % of GDP, 1956 - 2012 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank
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Figure 4: Composite view 
 
To enable comparability with the other indices, for this figure the social instability index has been 
expressed out of 100. 
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